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Między zasadami rynku a bezpieczeństwem państwa: Ład gospodarczy 
w międzywojennej Polsce w warunkach systemu autorytarnego (1926–1939)
abstract
The article performs the analysis of the political views on economy that had an im-
portant impact on the concepts of economic policy in the Republic of Poland put forward 
by Piłsudski and Piłsudski’s camp – the authoritarian camp ruling in the Republic of Po-
land from 1926 to 1939. The author investigates the traces and the evidence of the political 
thought (i.e. the source material produced by the politicians of the political party and the 
description of decisions they made at that time).
The scope of the interest included the property regulations that were grounded not 
only in the economical context, but, in particular – the political one. The political bases 
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for economic decisions made by Józef Piłsudski and his camp and the successors were 
under research. In the period of the power transfer the followers of Józef Piłsudski did not 
legitimise the coup using the economic perspective even though the financial situation of 
the country was to deteriorate. Only after the coup had succeeded was the property order 
formulated, including the scope and the dimension of the economic order. 
Key words: authoritarianism, political thought, economy, political system
1. iNtroDuctioN
The political views on economy that determined the economic policy 
pursued in the Second Republic, particularly in relation to the adopted 
ownership regulations, were the consequence of four variables situated in 
the political rather than economic context.
Firstly, the interwar Polish state envisioned by the irredentist movement 
(the political actor that consistently sought to achieve this goal, at least 
from 1908) was to be restored as the First Republic (First Commonwealth). 
However, the state emergent after the Great War was not the realization 
of this political vision. Despite far-reaching changes in the international, 
especially Central European, environment in 1918–1920, Józef Piłsudski and 
his supporters did not manage to fundamentally restructure international 
relations. Geopolitically, the new Poland was still located in the territory 
between Germany and Russia because the political community destroyed 
in the 18th century through the partitions of the First Republic was not 
rebuilt. Guided by this assessment, at least since 1923 Piłsudski forecast that 
a new war would break out in the region thereby endangering not only 
Poland’s sovereignty but also her overall existence, and contributing to the 
restoration of Russia’s imperial position. This attitude defined the economic 
policy pursued in the Second Republic. Political decisions, including those 
in the realm of ownership, would have to consistently contribute to the 
concentration of all resources in the event of crisis, which meant the rejection 
of economic experiments that would have endangered political consolidation 
in Poland on the one hand, and consumed budget resources on the other. 
The Piłsudski camp consistently emphasized that after the Great War it was 
time to cut down consumption by the contemporary generations and curb 
the uncontrolled satisfaction of social needs, and, instead, live a moderate 
life, work with sacrifice, build the state’s economic potential, and provide 
social support for the insolvent and unemployed1.
1 See: Zjazd działaczy gospodarczych i społecznych zwołany przez BBWR. Warszawa, 18, 19 
i 20 V 1933 r., Warszawa 1933, p. 199; J. Poniatowski, Przeciąć hamulce!, ‘Gazeta Narodowa’ 
1934, 12, p. 178; Podwójny obowiązek, ‘Gazeta Polska’ 14 April 1935, 104, p. 1.
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Secondly, the Second Republic had to face the danger of revolution – at 
first from the East, i.e. Bolshevism, and then also from the West, where 
triumphed fascism. While the latter influence was only external, rejected 
by the most of Polish political actors, the former was well received by the 
Communist groups in Poland and by a significant part of the minority 
communities, particularly in the Eastern Borderlands (Kresy). After the May 
coup d’état, Poland’s ruling politicians noticed the influence on the public 
opinion and lower classes exerted by ownership decisions taken in Soviet 
Russia and Nazi Germany. The interference with ownership relations, or 
even elimination of private ownership in the two neighboring countries, 
had the context of ethnicity and inhabiting the Eastern Borderlands. 
Therefore, it included Ukrainians, Belarusians, and Jews. Without the 
loyalty of national minorities, chiefly, the inhabitants of the Eastern 
Borderlands, the war strategy and defense capabilities of the state were 
an illusion. For that reason, the Polish authorities, guided by the Piłsudski 
camp’s political thought, had to counteract revolutionary propaganda 
against private ownership, and make prudent decisions that, consequently, 
would have transformed ownership without inciting a revolution or 
chaos. The former measures would have made the Piłsudskites, whose 
opponents kept reminding them of their (the Piłsudskites’) leftist and 
radical heritage, resemble the Bolsheviks and Nazis, the latter variant 
would have led to an economic collapse. The headquarters, however, had 
appropriate knowledge about the consequences of economic crisis based 
on the experience of the early 1920s and early 1930s.
Thirdly, after the May coup d’état, the main axis of political rivalry 
in the Second Republic was the dispute between the authoritarian camp 
and the democratic anti-system opposition with different ideological 
and conception/program orientations. The Piłsudskites, who exercised 
dictatorial rule between 1926 and 1939, did not have to seek the voters’ 
support i.e. in the most highly populated social strata such as peasants 
and workers. The reason for this was the power of Piłsudski and that of his 
successors. The fact that parliamentary elections were successively held, 
however, was not based on democratic legitimacy but it stemmed from 
a coup d’état. After May 1926, electoral promises lost their importance, 
which is why neither the dictator nor his adherents and successors had to 
seek the support of the populations in towns and villages by announcing 
fundamental changes in ownership relations. Piłsudski absolutely 
rejected this model of politics, regarding it as populist, propagandistic, 
irresponsible, and as a symptom of the particularism of the party. 
The Piłsudskites agreed that only dictatorship made it possible to put the 
economic policy in order and eradicate pathologies in this field It must 
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have occurred, however, against the will of society because democratic 
norms clash with economic principles, which impedes the rationalization 
of the economic system, economic activity and ownership relations2. 
Instead, the Piłsudskites decided to depoliticize society, which meant 
depriving many social and economic problems of political characteristics. 
While the attitude to ownership polarized the political area of the 
democratic Second Republic during 1918 to 1926, under the authoritarian 
rule between 1926 and 1939 it lost its significance as the main factor 
structuring the participants in political relations by the right-center-left 
criterion. The essence of the Piłsudski camp’s position was presented 
fairly exactly by Eugeniusz Kwiatkowski: ‘In economic evolution each 
fight, each confusion needlessly transferred from political life is a loss, 
and an economic loss is irretrievable’3.
Fourthly, the political thought of the Piłsudski camp had two highly 
important developmental features: dualism in ideological activity, and 
a specified direction of evolving. The political thought of the Piłsudski’s 
camp can be divided into two categories, mainly, the directive category 
and the non-directive one. The concepts and policy programs in the first 
category were personally formulated by the dictator, whereas in the other 
one he himself left only general guidelines. The political views on economy 
belonged to the second set of ideas, which meant that an almost free public 
debate on ownership was possible between different Piłsudskite groups. 
For the ownership decisions made by the governing camp, on the other 
hand, the most important was the evolution of conceptions and programs. 
In independent Poland Piłsudski severed his ties with the socialist 
movement as he viewed its program in the interwar period as radical 
and detrimental to the state, unrealistic to implement, and anachronistic 
with regard to the economic knowledge and international trends 
characteristic of the free market economy. After the May coup d’état the 
Commandant (as Piłsudski was often called) made a sharp turn towards 
the conservatives, whose important circles became part of his formation 
and their politicians joined the Sanacja (Sanation i.e. moral healing of 
the body politic) government. The intention was not only to reactivate 
2 Zdarzenia i poglądy, ‘Gospodarka Narodowa’ 1934, 3, p. 1; Jan Bobrzyński o kwestiach 
ustrojowych Drugiej Rzeczypospolitej, ed. E. Czapiewski, Warszawa 1998, pp. 163, 165, 186; 
E. Kwiatkowski, Prawo zwycięstwa: Odczyt, wygłoszony w Poznaniu 26 maja r. 1929, Warszawa 
1929, p. 30.
3 ‘W ewolucji gospodarczej każda walka, każdy zamęt, przeniesiony zbędnie z życia 
politycznego, to strata, a strata gospodarcza jest niepowetowana’. E. Kwiatkowski, Tendencje 
i postulaty rozwoju gospodarczego Polski: Referat, wygłoszony na kongresie Izb Przemysłowo-
Handlowych we Lwowie w dn. 3 września 1930 r., Warszawa 1930, p. 17.
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conservatism and apply its specific ideas but to utilize this movement to 
fight the main enemy – the national democratic right. After Piłsudski’s 
death, his successors led by Edward Śmigły-Rydz, faced by the prospect 
of a real war and the growing importance of the center-left opposition, 
began to adopt some projects typical of the national-democratic thought. 
This tendency also applied to their views on ownership. 
2. THE POLITICAL FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC DECISIONS
At the time of power takeover in the state as a result of a coup d’état the 
political thinking of the Piłsudski camp was characterized by three features. 
Firstly, Piłsudski did not justify the decision to carry out a military coup by 
means of economic arguments although the situation in the economy had 
crisis symptoms and actually facilitated the success of the coup perpetrators. 
The then eminent economist and Sanacja politician, Adam Krzyżanowski 
assessed this correctly: ‘Poor fiscal management paved Marshal Piłsudski’s 
way to success […]’4. The specific causes were pointed out by another 
economist, Roger Battaglia, who accused the ‘pre-May 1926’ democratic 
government of contributing to the collapse of economic reforms, of upsetting 
the balance between the sectors of the economy, ignoring the needs of the 
state and of pursuing a wrong fiscal policy5. Secondly, when taking over 
government in Poland, the Commandant did not have either his own 
economic program or a model of economic policy, or a vision of economic 
order. The foregoing issues did not have a priority status in his previous 
political activities, and his immediate associates were neither economic 
politicians, nor experts in this field or economic theorists6. Thirdly, Piłsudski 
and his associates believed that politics took precedence over management 
and economy, and idealist goals had priority over materialistic ones, and 
that the state’s power prevailed over economic life7. Without judicious 
politics, the political will and the strong state it was impossible to pursue 
either effective economic policy or efficient economy.
4 ‘Zła gospodarka skarbowa uścieliła Marszałkowi drogę do władzy […]’. 
A. Krzyżanowski, Polityka i gospodarstwo: Pisma pomniejsze oraz przemówienia 1920–1931, 
Kraków 1931, p. 346.
5 R. Battaglia, O programie gospodarczym Polski oraz o warunkach rozwoju poszczególnych 
gałęzi wytwórczości, Warszawa 1927, pp. 23–27.
6 Z. Landau, Plan stabilizacji 1927–1930: Geneza, założenia, wyniki, Warszawa 1969, 
pp. 14, 39; J. Rakowski, Ideologia gospodarcza epoki Józefa Piłsudskiego, ‘Niepodległość’ 1948, 
1, pp. 119–135; M. Leczyk, Oblicze społeczno-polityczne Drugiej Rzeczypospolitej, Warszawa 
1988, p. 215.
7 Polityka i ekonomia, ‘Gazeta Polska’ 29 December 1938, 356, p. 1.
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Those issues were the grounds for taking four crucial and systemic 
decisions by the Piłsudski camp: 1) continuation of the policy of the 
predecessors, which meant not only giving up revolutionary actions but 
also refraining from announcing their own economic program; 2) the 
long-term ministerial and high-ranking administrative appointments by 
Piłsudski of politicians who had different economic views but rejected 
radical thinking about the economy, which was noticeable in treasury, 
planning, agriculture, industries and in trade8; 3) creation in the Piłsudskite 
formation of favorable conditions for many policy debates between 
various Piłsudskite orientations, involving academic and economic 
circles9; 4) the simultaneous development of dialogue and consultations 
with both the workers/employees and with so-called economic spheres, in 
the form of economic meetings and creation of consultative institutions10. 
The idea-building activities of the Piłsudskite camp were characterized by 
exceptional caution in dealing with economic issues, including ownership. 
Consequently, the Piłsudskite camp rejected the revolutionary variant, 
thereby challenging the doctrinaire and teleological attitude as well as the 
politicization of the problem, for the benefit of the option of cooperation 
with the managerial personnel, economy experts, representatives of 
businessmen, landowners, and employees. Support was sought for the 
policy of avoiding risky actions; instead, the ruling camp wanted to 
utilize measures tried and tested in theory and practice. It was therefore 
8 See: M. Jabłonowski, Z dziejów gospodarczych Polski lat 1918–1939, Warszawa 1992, 
pp. 266–269.
9 Public debates between politicians, officials, and theoreticians, involving the Piłsudski 
camp’s radicals, liberals and conservatives produced important policy documents: Na froncie 
gospodarczym: W dziesiątą rocznicę odzyskania niepodległości. 1918. 11 XI 1928, Warszawa 
1928; Zagadnienie etatyzmu w Polsce: Stenogramy przemówień wygłoszonych na zebraniu u posła 
Janusza Radziwiłła w dniach 12 grudnia 1928 r. i 10 stycznia 1929 r., Warszawa 1929; Pięć lat 
na froncie gospodarczym 1926–1931, Warszawa 1931; Archiwum Akt Nowych [hereinafter: 
AAN], Bezpartyjny Blok Współpracy z Rządem. Sekretariat Generalny i Klub Parlamentarny 
w Warszawie, ref. no. 3, pp. 71–78; Zjazd Działaczy Gospodarczych i Społecznych, ‘Gazeta 
Polska’ 20 May 1933, 138, p. 5; Uprzemysłowienie Polski: Tezy Rady Naczelnej OZN uchwalone 
w dniach 28–29 II i 1 III 1939 r., Warszawa 1939; AAN, Obóz Zjednoczenia Narodowego. 
Centrala w Warszawie [hereinafter: OZN], ref. no. 26, pp. 8–11.
10 See: Materiały odnoszące się do działalności Rządu w czasie od 15 maja 1926 roku do 31 
grudnia 1927: Sprawozdania ministerstw, Warszawa 1928; Inwestycje, kredyty, konsumpcja, 
eksport, żegluga: Obrady gospodarcze w dn. 22 i 23 lutego 1928, Warszawa 1928; Narady 
gospodarcze Rządu z Delegatami Izb Przemysłowo-Handlowych w dniu 7 i 8 października 1929 r., 
Warszawa 1929; Bieżące zagadnienia polityki gospodarczej, vol. 1, Prace Komisji Opiniodawczej 
(przemysłowej) przy Prezesie Komitetu Ekonomicznego Ministrów, Warszawa 1927; Bieżące 
zagadnienia polityki gospodarczej, vol. 4, Sprawozdanie z działalności Komisji Opiniodawczej 
Pracy przy Prezesie KEM za okres od dnia 17 XI 1926 r. do dnia 1 VII 1928 r., Warszawa 1928; 
AAN, Prezydium Rady Ministrów w Warszawie, ref. no. 491, pp. 3–9.
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emphasized that Poland was not a center of the world economy and did 
not impact either international economic situations or global crises but 
it was dependent on the world trends and had to adjust to them. This 
approach was most noticeable in the conditions of overcoming the Great 
Depression (1929–1933) and war mobilization effort (1936–1939).
The state authorities undertook three main tasks: to counteract 
revolution as it caused chaos and the collapse of the state; to seek an 
optimal economic system for Poland; and to activate the mechanism of 
management. Without accomplishing the last two tasks it was impossible 
to achieve political consolidation necessary for the implementation of 
Poland’s own vision of the organization of Central Eastern Europe (the 
so-called grand idea), and to oppose the Russian and German powers, 
which would inevitably cause another war. The postulated ownership 
structure would be the means to implement priority goals. From this 
angle, the Piłsudskites were pragmatic and realistic politicians, which 
is why they had no qualms about utilizing different economic theories, 
sometimes mutually conflicting or exclusive to one another, on condition 
that they did not bear the mark of Bolshevism and Nazism. Their 
pragmatism manifested itself in the conviction that economy resembled 
politics, which is why one could not be guided in decision-making by 
mathematical formulas, certainty, and predictability. Economic decision-
making would be determined by one universal criterion: the realistically 
identified, correctly described and diagnosed interest of the state realized 
in concrete historical conditions11. That attitude meant that the economic 
order was not a primary value in economic thinking; it should at least 
be assigned to achieving non-economic goals and to the interests of the 
Republic of Poland.
The changing historical conditions in which Poland operated fully 
justified the direction of evolution of the Piłsudski camp’s political 
thought. In the first months after the May coup d’état, the guiding 
principle was most often the canons of neoclassical liberal economics. 
A view was therefore propagated (Roger Battaglia, Czesław Klarner, 
Ignacy Matuszewski, Józef Poniatowski) that economic life did not require 
a program while the development mechanism itself would have restored 
the necessary economic balance. That would have occurred due to the 
fact that there were economic laws that could not have been ignored but 
should have been utilized to put things in Poland in order. Economic 
management, it was believed, consisted in rational choices by individuals 
11 Doktryna i życie, ‘Gazeta Polska’ 22 April 1932, 111, p. 1.
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inclined to compete and carry out production and consumption activities12. 
Therefore, the state could have not destroyed the foundations of running 
the economy. However, the neoclassical liberal economics option was 
majorly adjusted. Other trends in economics were then utilized, first of all 
the historical school and economic nationalism. 
Between 1926 and 1935 the Piłsudski camp’s economic thought was 
dominated by neoclassical liberal economics. Guided by the findings 
of its authors, the Piłsudskites believed that the economy should be 
subordinated to raison d’état, i.e. a typically political category, which, 
in the interwar period, meant the need to overcome Poland’s economic 
weakness13. Eugeniusz Kwiatkowski showed four causes of that weakness; 
1) too much labor force compared to available jobs, and too many jobs 
compared to the consumption capacity; 2) the destruction of the national 
wealth and capital during the war (WW1); 3) the cost of integration of 
the three post-Partition territories that had different economic structures; 
4) cutting off of the Polish economy from its natural markets (Russian and 
German)14. The overcoming of these weaknesses would be effected by 
creating optimal macroeconomic conditions in the state, by implementing 
the program of condition-dependent economic policy, and by supporting 
growth factors by the authorities. If the measures advocated by the 
followers of the historical school and economic nationalism were applied, 
it was motivated by the objective needs of the Polish state. When state 
egoism, protectionism and economic nationalism began to prevail under 
the conditions of overcoming the huge economic crises, then this strategy 
was treated as erroneous and disadvantageous to Poland. It was hoped, 
nevertheless, that it would be a temporary model of economic policy15. 
12 R. Battaglia, O programie, pp. 14–16; C. Klarner, Drogi sanacji gospodarczej: Mowy 
ministra skarbu Czesława Klarnera wygłoszone w sejmie w dniu 22 czerwca 1926 r., w senacie 
w dniu 30 czerwca 1926 r., Warszawa 1926, pp. 21–23; Narady gospodarcze Rządu z Delegatami 
Izb Przemysłowo-Handlowych w dniu 7 i 8 października 1929 r., Warszawa 1929, p. 333; 
J. Poniatowski, Polityka gospodarcza wobec koniunktury, ‘Gospodarka Narodowa’ 1931, 6, 
pp. 85–87. See: B. Okoniewska, Gospodarka liberalna czy etatystyczna? Dyskusje o modelu 
gospodarczym Polski międzywojennej, ‘Dzieje Najnowsze’ 1993, 4, pp. 29–38.
13 See: A. Lityńska, Polska myśl ekonomiczna okresu międzywojennego, Kraków 1995; 
J. Kofman, Nacjonalizm gospodarczy – szansa czy bariera rozwoju: Przypadek Europy Środkowo-
Wschodniej w okresie międzywojennym, Warszawa 1992; M. Łapa, Modernizacja państwa: Polska 
polityka gospodarcza 1926–1929, Łódź 2002; U. Zagóra-Jonszta, Spory o model gospodarki 
Drugiej Rzeczypospolitej. (Problemy etatyzmu, planowania i kartelizacji), Katowice 1991.
14 Wytyczne programu gospodarczego rządu: Mowa min. E. Kwiatkowskiego, wygłoszona 
w dn. 8 b.m., ‘Dzień Polski’ 11 May 1930, 127, p. 3.
15 Zjazd działaczy gospodarczych i społecznych zwołany przez BBWR. Warszawa, 18, 19 i 20 V 
1933 r., Warszawa 1933, pp. 30–34; A. Rose, Wytyczne polityki europejskich państw rolniczych 
po 1932 r., ‘Przemysł i Handel’ 2 January 1932, 1, pp. 5–7; idem, Wobec możliwości zmiany 
BETWEEN MARkET PRINCIPLES AND STATE SECURITy... 411
Doi: 10.17951/rh.2020.49.403-423
When the political model in question became established, an increasingly 
large group of the Piłsudskites was ready to adopt the rules of economic 
nationalism in the Republic. It was observed that the world economy 
destroyed unity, solidarity and freedom of exchange for protectionist 
attitudes. According to the publications in the Gazeta Polska, this was how 
Poland should behave, finding its own strategy for escaping crisis, getting 
ready for war, and stimulating economic situation16. 
3. THE POSTULATED OWNERSHIP ORDER
The Piłsudskite camp regarded private ownership as the ground for the 
capitalist order in economy and the necessary condition for conducting 
economic activities and enjoying freedom. Three reasons for preferring 
ownership of this kind were given: it stimulated private enterprise, 
encouraged economic effort, and motivated for action. For these general 
reasons the state was expected to guard private ownership. However, the 
subject of discussions among the Piłsudskites was the problem of constraints 
imposed on this type of ownership. Before May 1926 two restrictions 
were pointed out: 1) the subordination of private economy to the state’s 
industrial and trade policy; 2) the compulsory buyout of landed property 
for agricultural reform17. However, after the power takeover, declarations 
of this kind were not officially voiced, instead, it was announced that 
a middle-of-the road policy would be pursued regarding ownership 
issues. Such policy statements were made by politicians appointed by 
Piłsudski to run the economic affairs – Kazimierz Bartel, Czesław Klarner, 
Eugeniusz Kwiatkowski – in June and July 1926 when they publicly 
spoke on the intent to carry out a ‘middle-of-the-road’ policy18. The said 
międzynarodowej polityki gospodarczej, ‘Przemysł i Handel’ 13 August 1932, 33, pp. 957–959; 
idem, Na progu nowego roku, ‘Gazeta Polska’ 5 January 1932, 5, p. 1; W.M. Zawadzki, 
Zagadnienia państw rolnych Europy Środkowej i Wschodniej, ‘Przemysł i Handel’ 27 August 
1932, 35, p. 1010; I. Matuszewski, Powszechna solidarność gospodarcza, ‘Gazeta Polska’ 
28 August 1930, 236, p. 1; W. Fabierkiewicz, Wytyczne najbliższej przyszłości gospodarczej, 
‘Gazeta Polska’ 7 November 1931, 304, p. 1; idem, Interwencjonizm państwowy, ‘Gazeta 
Polska’ 8 January 1932, 8, p. 1.
16 b.ł., Cuius regio – eius religio, ‘Gazeta Polska’ 29 October 1935, 300, p. 1; [Przemówienie 
Bogusława Miedzińskiego w sejmowej komisji budżetowej z 8 II 1936 roku], ‘Gazeta Polska’ 9 February 
1936, 40, pp. 6–7; Postępy interwencjonizmu, ‘Gazeta Polska’ 1 August 1936, 213, p. 1.
17 Konfederacja Ludzi Pracy (Projekt), Warszawa 1924, pp. 14–15.
18 See: Z. Landau, Plan, pp. 17–29; M. Łapa, Polityka stabilizacyjna w gospodarce polskiej 
po przewrocie majowym (15 May – 30 September 1926 r.), ‘Acta Universitatis Lodzensis. Folia 
Historica’ 1998, 61, pp. 160–162.
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policy meant balancing between the defense of private ownership by the 
state against revolution directly endangering Poland’s independence 
but also indirectly threatening it with destruction of the social order and 
economic system, and the imposition upon the owning classes of duties 
for the Republic and for the lower classes who could have threatened the 
raison d’état and formed the social basis for revolutionaries. The balance 
of this kind was regarded as beneficial to the Polish state in the existing 
internal historical conditions (economic weakness) and international ones 
(between the Bolsheviks and the Nazis). 
In this way the Piłsudski camp rejected extreme solutions consisting in 
the dispossession of owners for the state’s firm involvement in the economy, 
the restriction of freedom of economic entities, and the imposition of 
social obligations on entrepreneurs and employers. The radical-leftist and 
conservative-rightist approaches were thus challenged because the former 
threatened to destroy the economic mechanism and the economic order 
while the latter would have resulted in hostility or at least indifference 
towards the state on the part of the lower classes. Experts in economics 
called the Piłsudski camp’s economic policy solidarism, the confrontation 
of contradictions, or the search for compromise19. In accordance with 
these messages, many decisions were made between 1926 and 1935 which 
actually constituted interference in ownership: the land was parceled 
out according to the government plan, the state sector was expanded, 
the state took over insolvent businesses, the banking and loan system 
was subordinated to the state, the state’s interference in labor relations 
increased, and economic planning was initiated20.
Between 1935 and 1939 the Piłsudski camp began to emphasize the 
need to increase state interference in the use of ownership rights and 
in ownership relations. The new direction of activities was explicitly 
articulated in 1938. One of the OZN [Camp of National Unity] policy 
programs read ‘The use of private ownership cannot be made to the 
detriment of the public interest’21. Even firmer was the opinion expressed 
19 See: R. Battaglia, Dobrobyt społeczeństwa a wychowanie, Warszawa 1932, pp. 49–50; 
J. Rothschild, Marshal Józef Piłsudski on State (Society Dialectics in Restored Interwar Poland, in: 
Poland between the Wars: 1918–1939: A collection of Papers and Discussions from the Conference 
“Poland between the Wars: 1918–1939” held in Bloomington, Indiana, February 21–23, 1985. 
A Publication of the Indiana University Polish Studies Center, Bloomington, ed. T. Wiles, Indiana 
1989, p. 34; M. Nowak, T. Włudyka, Rynek kredytowy w Drugiej Rzeczypospolitej, Kraków 
1992, p. 103.
20 K. Dziewulski, Spór o etatyzm. Dyskusja wokół sektora państwowego w Polsce 
międzywojennej 1919–1939, Warszawa 1981, p. 20; W. Roszkowski, Etatyzm przemysłowy 
w Polsce w latach kryzysu 1929–1935, ‘Przegląd Historyczny’ 1972, 1, pp. 76–77.
21 AAN, OZN, ref. no. 23, p. 49.
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by Wacław Makowski: ‘[…] the state can use private ownership at its own 
discretion; at best this will be the issue of compensation and its possible 
amount’22.
When analyzing the Piłsudski camp’s political thought in the context of 
private ownership in the period between 1926 and 1939, two changes can 
be noticed. Firstly, from 1926 to 1935 ownership restrictions were justified 
by invoking raisons d’état whereas between 1935 and 1939 national 
justifications (or the need to weaken foreign (non-Polish) holdings) were 
increasingly emphasized,. Secondly, when establishing the authoritarian 
system between 1926 and 1935, attention focused on explaining the reasons 
for measures to expropriate taken by the state against private ownership. 
However, after the mid-1930s the state’s obligations towards the national 
holdings were emphasized.
In the Piłsudskite political thought three ownership problems were the 
subject of exceptional interest of the ruling camp between 1926 and 1939: 
1) parceling out of landowners’ land among peasants; 2) the nationalization 
of private businesses, unprofitable and ruined by crises; 3) the ‘Polonization’ 
of jobs for important strategic, capital or nationality reasons. Nevertheless, 
the Piłsudskites intended the ownership transformation in Poland to be 
carried out with the observance of five rules of economic management: 1) 
market economy influenced by the state tending towards social solidarity 
and respecting historical determinants; 2) the capitalist order built upon 
guarantees of economic freedom, respect for private ownership and 
profitability of economic activities; 3) the precedence of Poland’s political 
raisons d’état over economic interests and social needs; 4) the indispensably 
strong and efficient state to ensure economic development; 5) the gradual 
and state-guided build-up of the foundations of modern economy.
The range and scope of the ownership transformation planned and 
carried out by the ruling camp in Poland between 1926 and 1939 was 
subordinated to the achievement of political goals, which evolved during that 
period. The ‘middle-of-the-road’ policy announced in 1926 was to stop the 
ownership demands by the lower classes represented by the leftist, centrist 
and minority parties and to significantly reduce the intensity of political 
dispute over these issues, which paralyzed the political arena in Poland and 
harmed state interests. The Piłsudski camp wanted to consolidate the whole 
society around the state, which is why they maintained their image of the 
advocates of employee groups (derived from their socialist past) but at the 
22 ‘[…] państwo może dysponować własnością prywatną według uznania, co 
najwyżej w grę wchodzić będzie kwestia odszkodowania i jego ewentualnego wymiaru’. 
W. Makowski, My i wy, Warszawa 1938, p. 204.
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same time they strove to neutralize the peasants – both Polish and those 
of national minorities – and to win over the affluent classes and the Jewish 
population. After 1935 the general goal changed. The evolution of the 
international situation, consequences of the economic crises, effects of the 
policy conducted in the Third Reich, Italy, and in the Soviet Union justified 
the treatment of economy as a political means to mobilize all socio-economic 
groups having Polish ethnic-cultural characteristics and constituting the 
national community. The point of reference was no longer Poland’s multi-
ethnic society. Ownership transformations could not therefore diminish 
the Polish holdings but could only lead to their extension at the expense of 
national minorities inhabiting both the Eastern and Western Borderlands, 
and in towns and in the country. The national consolidation was the goal of 
the middle-of-the road-policy, which is why the postulated range and scope 
of the state’s interference in ownership relations in Poland was reconsidered 
and altered. 
4. THE RANGE AND SCOPE OF OWNERSHIP
Regardless of the model of the announced and implemented economic 
policy, in the Piłsudski camp there was internal debate going on between the 
followers of neoclassical liberal economics and economic nationalism. Two 
groups emerged during the disputes. One was the camp’s conservatives 
and liberals, who were opposed in the Piłsudski camp by the radicals23. Out 
of many subjects of controversy, the one that emerged the Polish model of 
economic order. While both Piłsudskite groups were against revolutionary 
ownership transformations, the latter opted for the development of state 
ownership. In the period between 1935 and 1939 political and economic 
processes significantly strengthened the position of the radicals in the 
Piłsudski camp: they began to impose their way of thinking upon the 
23 For more on the two ‘economic’ orientations in the Piłsudski camp see: J. Faryś, Myśl 
gospodarcza piłsudczyków 1926–1935, ‘Szczecińskie Studia Historyczne’ 1987, 1, pp. 145–169; 
M.M. Drozdowski, O myśli politycznej piłsudczyków polemicznie, ‘Dzieje Najnowsze’ 1969, 2, 
p. 98; idem, Stefan Starzyński prezydent Warszawy, Warszawa 1980, pp. 24–33; K. Grzybowski, 
Pięćdziesiąt lat 1918–1968, Kraków 1977, p. 132; J.M. Majchrowski, Silni–zwarci–gotowi: Myśl 
polityczna Obozu Zjednoczenia Narodowego, Warszawa 1985, pp. 88–89; J. Rakowski, op. cit., 
pp. 123–127; W. Nowicki, Polska myśl ekonomiczno-rolnicza w latach 1918–1939, in: Zarys 
polskiej myśli ekonomiczno-rolniczej do drugiej wojny światowej, ed. A. Żabko-Potopowicz, 
Wrocław–Warszawa–Kraków–Gdańsk 1973, pp. 328–332; T. Kowalik, Historia ekonomii 
w Polsce 1864–1950, Wrocław–Warszawa–Kraków 1992, pp. 151–161; Z. Landau, Władysław 
Zawadzki (1885–1939): Ekonomista–polityk–minister skarbu, ‘Przegląd Historyczny’ 1980, 4, 
pp. 753–771.
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politicians who made decisions on economic matters. The liberal and 
conservative economists went on the defensive i.a. because of changes in 
economic thinking on the global scale. A new axis of division emerged in 
the authoritarian camp: between the rightist and leftist radicals. One of 
the subjects of contention was ownership issues. Proponents of economic 
nationalism explicitly demanded that ownership transformations be 
carried out to strengthen the Polish holdings at the expense of the property 
held by foreign capital and national minorities. In contrast, the leftist 
radicals remained faithful to statism, i.e. they consistently supported the 
build-up of the state ownership sector. Ownership transformations were 
ignored, which were the main programmatic demand voiced by the Camp 
of National Unity (OZN). 
Political programs and public policy on the foregoing three issues 
determined the range and scope of ownership transformations postulated 
or/and implemented by the Piłsudskites. Most political passions were 
inflamed by the issue of land reform, in which the Piłsudski camp was 
involved throughout the 1926–1939 period. After the May coup the 
Piłsudskite radicals expected an almost agrarian revolution concerning 
the form of land ownership and implementation of land reform for the 
peasants24, but the Commandant decided to hand over the conduct of the 
agrarian policy to the camp’s conservatives and liberals (Witold Staniewicz, 
Leon Kozłowski, Leon Janta-Połczyński, Seweryn Ludkiewicz, Bronisław 
Nakoniecznikow-Klukowski, and Karol Niezabitowski), which meant the 
repudiation of radical projects and the adoption of the rule that the agrarian 
reform should not be a social task, i.e. it should not stem from the wish to 
quickly increase the holdings of the peasants or to protect landowners’ 
holdings. The ‘middle-of-the-road’ policy was chosen: on the one hand, 
as the conservatives would have it, economic instruments were used 
to stabilize large-scale commercial farms, mainly those of landowners, 
on the other hand land ownership was spread to the rural peasantry in 
order to amplify their identification with the state and participation in the 
economic system as owners of workplaces. The spread of land ownership 
would, first of all, increase Poland’s economic potential, not just reinforce 
the identification of peasants with the state. The land reform was therefore 
recognized as an economic undertaking, which should be carried out in 
a rational, fair, and honest way, in accordance with the financial capability 
of the state, and should be based on three premises.
Firstly, Piłsudski and his associates did not hope to reform the 
agrarian relations in the Polish countryside because they knew that 
24 See: W. Stpiczyński, My, piłsudczycy, ‘Głos Prawdy’ 7 November 1926, 166, p. 674.
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the land reserves were too small to satisfy social expectations, plans of 
experts, and political calculations (above all of peasant party activists)25. 
The Piłsudskites negatively assessed the economic conditions of the Polish 
peasantry, pointing out the low profitability of farms, overpopulation of 
the rural areas, or the negligible ability to accumulate capital in the rural 
economy26. For those reasons they did not overestimate the importance 
of the parceling out of land but they put emphasis on agrarian reform 
in the broad sense, in which parceling out would be accompanied by 
a comprehensive restructuring of the agrarian system. Secondly, the 
Piłsudski camp intended to solve the problem of ownership in agriculture 
in the long-term by means of intermediate measures: stable and long-
lasting economic growth, and industrialization and urbanization of the 
state. That is why the land reform was a political means used not so much 
to improve agrarian relations as to restructure the state’s internal market 
and to support industrial development27. Thirdly, landowners’ and peasant 
farms were expected to create complementary segments in agriculture, 
oriented towards cooperation rather than being the economic foundations 
of separatist group identities utilized by political parties. The Piłsudskites 
believed that the conditions for the land reform and its pace were intended 
to strengthen the unity of rural communities, regardless of their ethnic, 
social, occupational, and ownership diversification28. They rejected 
the view of parceling out as a factor of seeking peasant support for the 
Piłsudski camp at the expense of carrying out revolutionary changes in the 
social stratification of the rural population and through the redistribution 
of incomes by the state for the rural poor.
Under the conditions analyzed above, the land reform of 1926–1935 
became, as the ruling camp wanted, a typical market transaction, spread 
out over time, without involving state coercion and expensive economic 
instruments. The state would be an intermediary between the landowners 
and the peasants, would financially support both sides, establish legal 
25 W. Roszkowski, Gospodarcza rola większej prywatnej własności ziemskiej w Polsce 1918–
1939, Warszawa 1986, pp. 338–340.
26 A. Rose, Możliwości naprawy ustroju rolnego za pomocą ustawodawstwa, ‘Przemysł 
i Handel’ 15 December 1928, 51, p. 2078; W. Staniewicz, O program agrarny w Polsce 
i jego wykonanie: Mowy i przemówienia (1926–1928), Warszawa 1928, pp. 95, 115–116; idem, 
Przebudowa ustroju rolnego w Polsce: Przemówienie na Radzie Głównej Naprawy Ustroju Rolnego 
w Warszawie 31. stycznia – 1928 r., Warszawa 1928, p. 44; C. Klarner, Przemysł i handel 
w pierwszym dziesięcioleciu niepodległości Polski, Warszawa 1929, pp. 19–20.
27 W. Staniewicz, Przemówienie Ministra Reform Rolnych… na 14 posiedzeniu Sejmu w dn. 
1 czerwca 1928 r., Warszawa 1928, p. 5.
28 Idem, Przebudowa, p. 75; idem, Dwa lata dalszej pracy nad przebudową ustroju rolnego 
w Polsce (1928–1929), Warszawa 1930, p. 88.
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norms, guard economic rationality, and stabilize the foundations of the 
economic system. Regarding the pace of changes, the following regularity 
can be observed: in favorable economic conditions the Piłsudskite 
politicians encouraged land reform whereas in recession they advocated 
the slowing-down of ownership transformations29. The latter attitude was 
the dominant one between 1929 and 1934/1935. The state in economic 
crisis lost its possibilities to protect the land reform, which is why the pace 
and scale of parceling out was reduced and subordinated to the state’s 
agricultural policy. The next change was carried out after the mid-nineteen 
thirties when Piłsudski’s successors began to abandon the previous rules 
of effecting ownership transformations in agriculture. The government 
circles (Minister of Agriculture and Agrarian Reforms Juliusz Poniatowski) 
began to speak of resuming the land reform to achieve temporary positive 
social effects by stopping the radicalization of the peasant masses in the 
country30. The OZN declarations showed the land reform as an ‘economic’ 
measure to ‘Polonize’ economic life in the rural areas, which means that 
the beneficiaries of the resumed large-scale parceling out would be not 
only local peasants but also farmers of Polish ethnic group. The OZN 
agrarian theses urged support for ‘the purchase of land by the local Polish 
population and the Polish settlers’31.
To the Piłsudski camp, the second most important ownership problem 
after the land reform was the takeover of private enterprises by the state 
(referred to as ‘healing’). This practice was applied most strongly during 
the Great Depression and was motivated by extraordinary circumstances. 
In the second half of the 1930s there were heated debates among the 
Piłsudskites about the future status of the temporarily nationalized 
economic entities. The rightist radicals in the OZN announced that they 
would curb nationalization, start reprivatization, and protect private 
ownership through economic planning. They dissociated themselves 
from the state’s domination of ownership. In contrast, the leftist radicals 
voiced different demands: they wanted to absolutely reject the negative 
attitude towards state ownership exhibited by the camp’s liberals and 
conservatives, in favor of the plan of socializing jobs and business entities 
by dispossessing businessmen and landowners32.
29 J. Ciepielewski, Polityka agrarna rządu polskiego w latach 1929–1935, Warszawa 1968, 
pp. 57, 84.
30 M.M. Drozdowski, Polityka rolna rządu polskiego w latach 1936–39, ‘Roczniki Dziejów 
Ruchu Ludowego’ 1959, 1, pp. 96–106.
31 ‘popierać nabywanie ziemi przez miejscową ludność polską oraz przez polskich 
osadników’. AAN, OZN, ref. no. 26, p. 4.
32 For more on the socialization of private ownership see: J. Gołębiowski, Spór o etatyzm 
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After the mid nineteen-thirties, the third ownership issue was 
politicized thanks to the Piłsudskites associated in the OZN. A proposal 
was put forward to ‘Polonize’ or ‘nationalize’ the economy, which meant 
the transfer of ownership according to the criterion of nationality. The 
OZN’s policy documents emphasized two dimensions of Polonization 
of ownership. Firstly, the Poles would take over land and businesses 
previously owned by members of national minorities, mostly Jews and 
Germans, and by foreign capital. Secondly, the Polish state would make 
it difficult for Ukrainians and Belarusians to buy property, particularly 
land. The problem of Polonization was most pronounced in the Eastern 
and Western Borderlands33. The Piłsudski camp justified the Polonization 
measures by pointing out conflicts between the Polish state and the 
economic activities of members of national minorities and foreign 
economic entities. This new political project was a far-reaching change 
in the concepts and policy program for the Piłsudski camp’s political 
thought, affecting even the ideological sphere because it was borrowed 
from the ideological activity of the national-democratic movement and 
clashed with the previous views on private ownership and independence 
of the economy from ideology. 
Many documents proposed the four directions in which the measures 
of Polonization concerning ownership would be applied: 1) parceling from 
German and Jewish landed property; 2) apportioning of land to Polish 
settlers only; 3) halting the statutory takeover of Polish manor land by 
Ukrainian peasants; 4) handing over state businesses to Polish landowners 
in exchange for voluntary parceling out of manor land. Those directions 
of activities were expected to produce significant political effects: maintain 
Polish land holdings, increase the number of Polish-held businesses, 
privatize state-owned enterprises, and strengthen national ties between 
the peasants and landowners.
5. CONCLUSIONS
The Piłsudski camp which ruled Poland with absolute power 
between 1926 and 1939 was consistently in favor of private ownership, 
wewnątrz obozu sanacyjnego w latach 1926–1939, Kraków 1978, pp. 65–70.
33 Uprzemysłowienie Polski. Tezy Rady Naczelnej OZN uchwalone w dniach 28-29 lutego i 1 
marca 1939 r., Warszawa 1939 p. 19; Deklaracja ideowo-polityczna szefa Obozu Zjednoczenia 
Narodowego Adama Koca i przemówienia przewodniczącego organizacji wiejskiej Obozu 
Zjednoczenia Narodowego Andrzeja Galicy, Warszawa 1937, pp. 12–14, 62–63; J. Piasecki, 
O gospodarce planowej, Warszawa 1938, pp. 5–6, 15–17.
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considering it the best form of ownership that would enhance Poland’s 
potential and isolate the society from revolutionary attitudes that 
stemmed from intensified Bolshevik and Nazi propaganda and from 
the objective conditions existing in the Polish territories after the period 
of the Partitions. In matters of ownership, measures were taken in two 
directions: 1) depoliticization of problems of this kind; 2) decision-
making in accordance with the ‘middle-of-the-road’ policy. Democratic 
parties were accused that by their activities they aggravated conflicts 
between different social groups: entrepreneurs vs. workers, landowners 
vs. peasants, rural inhabitants vs. townspeople. The Piłsudskites regarded 
this attitude as detrimental to the Polish state. They decided to abandon 
it effectively and consistently by carrying out ownership transformations 
based on economic criteria despite the fact that ownership transformations 
would be subordinated to the realization of political goals because the 
Piłsudskites believed that respecting canons of economic knowledge could 
contribute to the economic development of Poland. 
When making the most important decisions concerning ownership 
issues, inspiration was sought from diverse theoretical schools of 
economics. First (before 1935), neoclassical liberal economics absolutely 
prevailed, amended by some solutions characteristic of the historical 
school. By combining the two approaches, the Piłsudski camp decided 
to pursue a ‘middle-of-the-road’ policy. With the growing danger of war 
and changes in the world economy after the Great Depression, economic 
nationalism was invoked but the canons of free market economy were 
not rejected. The globally dominant approach to the way out of the Great 
Depression was diagnosed fairly accurately. In their economic policies, 
the most important states in the contemporary world were guided above 
all by their own interest, giving up some of the solutions preferred by 
neoclassical liberal economics.
(translated by Jerzy Adamko)
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streszczeNie
Artykuł jest analizą poglądów politycznych na gospodarkę, decydujących o koncep-
cjach polityki gospodarczej, realizowanej w Polsce międzywojennej przez obóz piłsudczy-
kowski – obóz autorytarny rządzący w tym państwie w latach 1926–1939. Dokonano anali-
zy śladów i świadectw myśli politycznych, czyli źródeł wytworzonych przez polityków tej 
formacji politycznej oraz opisów podjętych wówczas decyzji. Przedmiotem zainteresowa-
nia były regulacje własnościowe, które miały nie tylko kontekst ekonomiczny, lecz przede 
wszystkim polityczny. Zbadano polityczne podstawy decyzji ekonomicznych podejmo-
wanych przez dyktatora Józefa Piłsudskiego i jego współpracowników oraz następców, 
a także recepcję ówczesnych teorii ekonomicznych. W czasie przejęcia władzy zwolennicy 
nie uzasadniali zamachu stanu za pomocą argumentów ekonomicznych, mimo, iż sytuacja 
w gospodarce nosiła znamiona kryzysowej. Dopiero po zamachu opracowano postulowa-
ny ład własnościowy, w tym zakres i zasięg zmian w porządku gospodarczym.
Słowa kluczowe: autorytaryzm, myśl polityczna, gospodarka, system polityczny
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